The Revival of Global Revolutionary Shi'ism, Part 1
Hezbollah, Iran and the Houthi Movement
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“Is it with death you threaten me? Death to us is normalcy and martyrdom is dignity offered from God…Today, we celebrate the significant historic Divine and strategic victory. How can the human mind imagine that a few thousand of your Lebanese resistance sons, I could give the precise number if need be, They stood in the open ground for 33 days exposed to the open skies without air cover in front of the strongest air force in the Middle East, provided by an air bridge to convey smart bombs from America, via Britain to “Israel”, faced with 40 thousand officers and soldiers, four brigades of Israel’s elite forces, three squads from the Army Reserve and in front of the strongest tank in the world and the most powerful army in the region.. if it wasn’t for the aid, help and support of God Almighty?”
- Excerpt from Hassan Nasrallah’s victory speech after the end of the 2006 War
“They are nothing like Hamas or the Palestinians. They are trained and highly qualified. All of us were kind of surprised.”
- Israeli soldier on Hezbollah after the events of the 2006 War (NYT)
The end of Revolutionary Shi’ism?
It is quite clear that since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, up until the present day, revolutionary Shia movements have been the rival of the United States and their allies in the middle east. This has been the case ever since the Revolution deposed the western friendly Shah. Geopolitically, Iran and groups like Hezbollah and the Houthi movement are opposed to the world’s premier military and economic force in the United States and the regional powerhouses of Saudi Arabia, The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel. Along with various Sunni Salafist groups that seek their destruction in the Iraqi and Syrian civil wars.
In recent years this revolutionary Shia project has experienced a resurgence of confidence and military skill on the battlefield. It is not one coherent movement but seems to come out of the reality of the situation in which these militants grow and learn. These groups share similar circumstances in the wars they fight, their upbringing and who they view as their enemies. Military tactics are spread through a network of secretive militants that spread tested strategies and propaganda. Revolutionary Shi’ism has gone through various historical stages but in the 21st century after a period of humiliation, it has experienced a successful renewal through a variety of successes.
After the mass blood let that was the Iran-Iraq war and the deliberately brutal sanctions that were put on Iran, it seemed as if revolutionary Shi’ism had begun to lose momentum. The speeches of Ayatollah Khomeini that emphasized the need for a proactive Shi’ism that sought to build a world worthy of God on the earth was losing its previous appeal. Revolutionary Shi’ism had not had a major military or political success in quite some time. Its Wahhabi rivals in the gulf were more favored by western powers and were gaining immense economic and political clout. The movement that had originally contributed to the formation of Hezbollah and other Shia militant groups in the 1980’s seemed to be losing global cohesion.
The ancient Shia minorities in Lebanon, Kuwait, Yemen and Saudi Arabia along with the majority populations in Bahrain and Iraq experienced an oppressed existence with limited political representation. Iran was also not offering the best model for what a Shia society could look like with their oppressive social laws and geopolitical outsider status. Shia minority populations were commonly found in the slums of their respective countries and were feared by Sunni elites thanks to the threat that was the Iranian Revolution. Some Radical political and religious activists still held onto the mythos of the Iranian Revolution throughout this period of declining power. Remaining Shia militants like Hezbollah maintained legitimacy among their base through a local social welfare model.
Most damming of all to the decline of radical political Shi’ism, was the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. Iraq is 60% Shia and the spiritual heart of Shi’ism. Numerous famed clerics taught and studied in its various holy cities and schools. This included some of the leaders of the 1979 Revolution and some of the shot callers of today’s militant Shia groups. Saddam’s secular Baathist rule held the Shia in a stable but destitute existence with limited political representation along with the rest of Iraq’s religious minorities. The United States broke Saddam’s shaky coalition. falsely accusing him of holding chemical weapons and implying he had a role in the September 11th attacks. This put a deep uncertainty and resentment into the outlook of Iraq’s various religious groups, as they were now taking the brunt of America’s violent misplaced rage for the events of 9/11.
The United States took Baghdad in a period of several days through vast bombardments. From this point, the American forces began a city capturing campaign. This included arguably the two most holy cities in Shi’ism, Karbala, and Najaf. The Shia had absolutely nothing to do with the September 11th attacks but American forces saw their resistance as worthy of the same military assaults as the ones against Al Qaeda. Both cities were subject to the full encirclement and assault by American troops. Civilians were killed and some holy sites were looted. Iraqi cities were subject to American governmental incompetence, losing electricity and other infrastructure capacity throughout the occupation.
It is difficult to imagine what the fall of the Shia holy cities in Iraq represented to the Shia population across the middle east. It was a humiliation of the highest scale and not only that but the supposed leader of revolutionary Shi’ism Iran, did nothing stop it. Karbala is of the utmost divinity in the theology of Shi’ism. When Husayn, the grandson of Muhammed, attempted to organize a resistance to the faction that had taken control of the first caliphate after Muhammed’s death, he was betrayed. His betrayers led the caliphate’s army to Huseyn’s location on a desert plateau (modern Karbala) where his band of 70 men was decimated by the new rulers of the caliphate that would form the fathers of Sunnism. This is not to say Shia and Sunni are sworn enemies, the spiritual fathers of both sects have been celebrated in both branches by Muslims for practically its entire history. It is in fundamentalist interpretations that arose in the 20th century, that this violent rivalry comes from.
This martyrdom of Husayn and his followers partially defines what makes Shi’ism different from Sunnism. That suffering and death in the fight for justice is holy in the eyes of God. That heroism is something to be idealized even if failure seems like the only option. Standing up for what is “right” is a crucial part of the theological interpretations of revolutionary Shi’ism. Groups like Hezbollah use this line of thinking as a key part of their propaganda. Transforming death in combat from something to be mourned to something to be celebrated and praised.
This is the same line of thinking that gave Khomeini’s faction so much power, they were not afraid to fight for their version of a better world even if death was imminent. Khomeini added to this theological rhetoric by borrowing from national liberation and decolonial projects from around the world. Lumping his revolutionary Shi’ism in with other fights for liberation, like the decolonial movement and borrowing Marxist ideas of revolution and conflicts place in history. He later however would betray the socialist and liberal reformers that helped his faction bring about the fall of the politically repressive Shah.
“Once again, I announce my support for all movements, fronts, and groups which are fighting in order to escape from the claws of the Eastern or Western superpowers. I announce my support for beloved Palestine and beloved Lebanon. Once again, I strongly condemn the dastardly occupation of Afghanistan by the plunderers and occupiers of the aggressive East. O hope that the Muslim and noble people of Afghanistan will as soon as possible achieve true victory and independence and be released from the grip of these so-called supporters of the working classes."
- Excerpt from a Khomeini’s speech right before he took power
When Karbala fell in 2003, it cast a dark shadow over the revolutionary Shia that held Husayn’s sacrifice in such high regard. Another massive army had outnumbered the Shia in Karbala once again and now held it for seemingly no particular reason. It looked as if Shi’ism was going to make a return to the self-pitying and stagnant ideology it had been known for before the Iranian Revolution. One side of Shi’ism reflects the sadness of its history, wallowing in the martyrdom of its past heroes. Some Shia groups on each anniversary of the defeat at Karbala in 680AD, form a procession of mourning souls to walk their city streets. The other side of Shi’ism, which saw its rebirth in the Iranian revolution expresses the need to fight for a dignified world against all odds. This version of revolutionary militant Shi’ism saw another, new revival during the dramatic events of the 2006 War between Hezbollah and Israel. This war would reignite the fuse of the movement.
Hezbollah’s grand “victory”
The 2006 War was caused by several complex factors. Hezbollah and Israel had a number of intense territorial, diplomatic and prisoner disputes. In 2000, Israel had withdrawn from their positions deep in Shia territory in Southern Lebanon that they had held since the end of the Lebanese Civil War. They no longer were willing to deal with the tit for tac violent exchanges between both parties. Hezbollah used this opportunity to extend their military and social party apparatuses into this territory. After a series of major disagreements Hezbollah launched a midnight cross border raid and captured three IDF hostages. This occurred while Hezbollah faked an assault on another part of the border, distracting the IDF. This began the 34-Day War and changed middle eastern politics forever.
Hezbollah has support throughout the Shia neighborhoods in Lebanon and recruits from tight knit kinship networks to great effectiveness. They are at the same time a guerrilla army, political party, mini government, and Iranian ally. They were formed in the early 1980’s during the Lebanese Civil War and gained popularity due to their ability to protect Shia communities from various sectarian rival’s deadly assaults. They also gained notoriety around the globe for their use of suicide bombing to attack a US Marine base in Beirut in 1983, causing the withdrawal of American forces.
They uphold a closely aligned brand of revolutionary Shi’ism to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) which are Iran’s main revolutionary agents. The Shia in southern Lebanon have been for some time one of the poorest populations in the country. Hezbollah represents a militant option for families that see revolutionary Shi’ism as a way out of this destitution. Not all Shia in the country support Hezbollah and there has been fighting between different Shia political parties. Hezbollah since 1992, has been led by Hassan Nasrallah a Shia cleric who studied in Najaf where he attended lectures by Khomeini and other radical Shia thinkers. After fighting in the Lebanese Civil War, he studied in Iran. He is strongly representative of the transnational aspects of revolutionary Shi’ism that came out of the 1979 Revolution. He is also well known for his secretive tactics, avoiding multiple Israeli assassination attempts and reportedly spending most of his time moving from safe house to safe house.
Israel had been ready for some time for a renewed confrontation with Hezbollah. Their build up on the southern border and statements by military officials reflected this. IDF rules dictate that the capture of Israeli hostages mandates an all-out assault to secure their safety. Hezbollah had wanted to swap the hostages for key officials they had thought been promised to them in a prior deal. The Israeli military responded within hours by launching comprehensive airstrikes at Lebanon’s infrastructure and supposed Hezbollah strongholds. These included bridges, roads, and all of Hezbollah’s major long range missile stockpile. This was done before the Israeli cabinet had even met to discuss the hostages. The IDF was very serious about going to war with Hezbollah and it seemed like this would be an easy victory for them.
Israel launched an all-out assault on Lebanon by air and sea soon followed by a land invasion. Most of this fire was focused on Southern Lebanon but it stretched across the country. There were so many bombs dropped and missiles fired that Israel reportedly began to run out of ammunition near the end of the war. The IDF used cluster bombs and phosphorus attacks to great international condemnation. Israel, like America did in Vietnam, thought that air support and overwhelming force was the ultimate weapon in a war against guerillas and could end the conflict rapidly. Hezbollah responded with short range missile attacks, but these attacks could not match Israel’s world leading military technology superiority.
“During and after the conflict, both parties have sought to justify their resort to force and the way they fought the war. Hizbullah launched its “Operation True Promise” on 12 July with the declared aim of obtaining the release of Lebanese and other Arab prisoners held in Israel by exchanging them with captured Israeli soldiers – as “promised” by its Secretary General, Hasan Nasrallah. After the war Hasan Nasrallah stated that had he known that Israel was going to respond so harshly he would not have ordered the 12 July raid.”
- From the Amnesty International report on the conflict which condemned both sides for their assaults on civilians.
What the IDF was not expecting to find in Hezbollah’s territory when they launched their ground assault was competent fighters willing to die for a cause. Several quotes by Israeli military officers after the war demonstrate that they were shocked by Hezbollah’s strategic and military skill. During their reoccupation of territory in southern Lebanon in the early 2000’s, Hezbollah created a complex network of tunnels, weapons caches and training facilities. When the IDF launched a ground assault, Hezbollah saw their enemy’s weakness as an inability to sustain casualties. This is opposite to the importance put on sacrifice by Hezbollah fighters.
Hezbollah used their highly developed guerrilla units to by most accounts completely overwhelm Israeli forces on the ground. Feint attacks, ambushes and intense secrecy were used by Hezbollah to turn the tide of the battle until the Israeli ground troops were forced to retreat. Most of this fighting was done in urban and mountain settings where Hezbollah took advantage of their local knowledge. It did not matter how much the IDF’s equipment outmatched Hezbollah Cold War era weaponry. Hezbollah always seemed to be one step ahead of were ever an Israeli unit was.
A ceasefire was eventually reached but immense damage had been done to Lebanon. The conflict killed around 1200 Lebanese civilians and a couple hundred Hezbollah fighters along with their allies in Palestinian and other anti-Israel militias. Hundreds of thousands of Lebanese were displaced and millions of dollars in infrastructure across Lebanon was destroyed. The original hostages taken by Hezbollah died as well, Israel says they were killed by Hezbollah and Hezbollah says they were killed in the massive Israeli bombardments. Undetonated cluster mines left by Israel are still killing people to this day.
44 Israeli civilians were killed and 121 IDF soldiers were killed. This was the largest casualty numbers suffered by the Israeli army in decades and shook the populace. This was also the first time an Arab army seemingly secured a victory against Israel in decades. It was not really a true victory because Lebanon was absolutely devasted and Hezbollah’s Shia communities were in ruin. However, the IDF still had to retreat and after years of military humiliation by Israel, someone had unexpectedly beat them and it was a revolutionary Shia guerilla force with close ties to Iran.
“They’re not fighting like we thought they would. They’re fighting harder. They’re good on their own ground.”
- IDF solider after the War (US ARMY Long War journal)
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